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ABSTRACT: The record of the nuclear test-ban negotiations
can well be read for its implications both for the procedure
of negotiating and the substance of arms-control agreements.
The history of the negotiations covers five years and includes
an unpoliced moratorium on testing nuclear weapons which
lasted nearly three years. Starting with the collapse of the
Paris summit meeting in 1960, the negotiations took a radical
turn for the worse, and, had it not been for the Cuban crisis
and heightened Sino-Soviet tensions, they might well have been
fruitless. The level of the United States technical prepara-
tion was not adequate to the task at hand, nor were crucial
political decisions taken prior to 1961. The impunity with
which the Soviet Union could abrogate the moratorium in 1961 
demonstrates the danger of dropping one’s guard. The experi-
ence of the negotiations suggests that areas where there is rela-
tive parity perhaps offer the most promise for arms-control
agreements and that more progress might be made if greater
emphasis were placed on national control or what has come to
be called adversary or reciprocal inspection techniques.
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I F the Treaty Banning NuclearWeapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and Under Water, signed
at Moscow on August 5, 1963, is to be
the first step toward a more peaceful
world, the record of the negotiations
which led to the treaty can well be
studied for its implications for the next
steps. That the negotiations yielded
the first major formal arms-control
agreement between East and West is
cause enough for examining them with
care. Of all the desultory talks on
related topics since the Second World
War, what was it that contributed to
the unprecedented success of these?
What is there to be emulated, and what
to be corrected? The record is all the
more pertinent since the negotiations
involved attempting to create controls
for one aspect of the highly complex
and rapidly changing technology of the
nuclear-missile arms race. In view of
the enormous destructive capacities of
modern weapons, controlling this race
is an essential ingredient in almost all
blueprints for a less frightful system of
international politics. The record of the
nuclear test-ban negotiations contains
implications both for the process of
attempting to achieve agreements in
this area and for their substance.
OVERVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
Since the negotiations were pro-
tracted and involved, it may be useful
to sketch their course in broad outline
before attempting to draw inferences.
Although the question of prohibiting or
restricting the testing of nuclear weap-
ons had been mooted almost since the
dropping of the first bombs on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki in August 1945,
it did not become a matter of serious
political discussion until after the
United States detonated a fifteen-mega-
ton thermonuclear device in the Bikini
Atoll on March 1, 1954. The injuries
to several Marshallese and to some
Japanese fishermen who happened to be
in the path of the fallout dramatized
one aspect of the danger of continued
testing. The more sophisticated were
more alarmed by their realization that
the techniques involved in this detona-
tion made nuclear weapons much
cheaper per megaton of yield and also
implied that the possibilities of increas-
ing their destructive capacities were
almost limitless. Pressures against the
continued testing of nuclear weapons
increased sharply as a consequence of
this test and the great powers seriously
discussed the issue in 1957 during the
London meetings of the United Nations
disarmament subcommittee.
Actual negotiations did not begin,
however, until the following year. They
were triggered by the Soviet decision
unilaterally to cease testing nuclear
weapons and not to resume unless
others engaged in testing, which was
announced on March 31, 1958, im-
mediately after the completion of the
Soviet Union’s most extensive test series
and shortly before the start of an
elaborate American series. The United
States response was to request a meeting
of technical experts from East and
West to examine the question of
whether or not a test ban could be
adequately monitored. Meanwhile, the
planned American test series would go
on as scheduled.
The Conference of Experts
The so-called Geneva Conference of
Experts met from July 1 to August 21,
1958 and, after examining the various
techniques of detection and identifica-
tion, concluded that it was &dquo;technically
feasible to set up, with certain capabili-
ties and limitations, a workable and
effective control system for the cessation
of nuclear weapons tests.&dquo; 1 Their re-
1 U. S., Department of State, Documents on
Disarmament, 1945-1959 (Publication 7008;
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
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port outlined a control system involving
from 160 to 170 land-based control
posts and about ten ships, which they
estimated would have a &dquo;good prob-
ability&dquo; of detecting and identifying
nuclear explosions of yields down to
one kiloton in the atmosphere and in
the open oceans and also a &dquo;good prob-
ability&dquo; of recording seismic signals
from deep underground nuclear ex-
plosions equivalent to one kiloton. In
the latter case, it was assumed that
there would be some difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the signals generated by ex-
plosions from those generated by earth-
quakes and that this difficulty would
increase significantly as one moved
down from five kilotons to one kiloton.
It was also known that the only method
of establishing positive proof that an
underground nuclear explosion had oc-
curred would be through the collection
of radioactive debris at the site. For
both reasons, some on-site inspections
were held to be necessary. Although
the Conference of Experts discussed in
general terms the problems involved in
the detection of nuclear explosions at
high altitudes and in outer space, it did
not suggest any control apparatus for
this environment.
The Geneva Conference
On the basis of the experts’ conclu-
sions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
proposed that the nuclear powers com-
mence negotiations on a test-ban agree-
ment and offered to withhold testing for
a period of one year from the beginning
of the negotiations. Thus began a
moratorium which would last almost
three years and the negotiations which
would ultimately result in the Moscow
Treaty.
The course of the negotiations was
jagged rather than smooth, though,
from surface appearances, they, and
American policy within them, followed a
logical and coherent pattern. Shortly
after the Geneva Conference on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests opened on October 31, 1958,
American scientists evaluating the re-
sults of the United States 1958 test
series concluded that there were serious
deficiencies in the control system out-
lined in the report of the Conference
of Experts. In August and early
September, the United States had fired
-for the first time-several shots at
high altitudes, one at height of nearly
twenty-seven miles, another at nearly
fifty miles, and three at approximately
three hundred miles. These tests made
obvious the need to add apparatus to
detect nuclear explosions at high alti-
tudes and in outer space to the control
system proposed by the Conference of
Experts.
The analysis of the Hardtack II
series of underground explosions con-
ducted in Nevada in September and Oc-
tober created an even more serious prob-
lem. The scientists concluded that the
seismic magnitude of the one previous
underground explosion-the September
1957 Rainier shot-which had formed
the principal basis for the calculations
of the Conference of Experts, had been
estimated incorrectly, that it probably
was somewhat smaller than had been
thought. This meant that many more
earthquakes would generate signals
equivalent to those of any given yield
underground nuclear explosion than had
been assumed and that, consequently,
the problem of discrimination between
earthquakes and clandestine explosions
would be greatly increased. More im-
portantly, the scientists discovered
that the background noise normally
recorded by seismographs might well
obscure the direction of the first motion
of a signal generated by an underground
Office, 1960), Vol. 2, p. 1091. For the
Communiqu&eacute; and the Report of the Con-
ference of Experts, see Ibid., pp. 1090-1111.
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event, which hitherto had been assumed
to be the most important criteria for
discriminating between underground ex-
plosions and earthquakes. The net
result was that the scientists now
thought that the threshold below which
it was unlikely that the control system
would be able to detect underground
nuclear explosions was nineteen rather
than five kilotons. At roughly the
same time, Albert Latter, a physicist
employed by the Rand Corporation,
doing paper and pencil analysis, dis-
covered that, by detonating a nuclear
explosion in a large underground cavity
of an appropriate size, it might be
possible to muffle its signal by a factor
of three hundred. This made the situa-
tion considerably more bleak.
The United States response to these
developments as it evolved in early
1959 was to launch a research program
to see if improved methods could not be
found for detecting nuclear explosions
and to request further technical talks.
At first the Soviet Union refused this
request, asserting that the report of the
Conference of Experts was, and had
to be taken as, the basis for the negotia-
tions. Eventually, in May 1959, the
Soviet Union agreed that there should
be a brief technical discussion of the
problems of detecting nuclear explosions
at high altitudes and in outer space.
Technical Working Group I, as it was
called, met in June and July 1959.
During these talks, the Soviet scientists
accepted all but one of the control
devices suggested by their American
counterparts. They refused to accept
backscatter radar, on the ground that
it could also be used to detect rocket
launchings. The Group recommended
various measures which could be in-
corporated in the control system recom-
mended by the Conference of Experts
to extend its capabilities to high alti-
tudes and outer space.
The problem of the capability of the
system to detect underground nuclear
explosions remained, however, and the
United States continued to press for
technical talks to discuss this. Finally,
in early November 1959, the Soviet
Union acquiesced, and Technical Work-
ing Group II met from November 2 to
December 18, 1959. Unlike the preced-
ing meetings of scientists, this session
ended in sharp disagreement. The
Soviet scientists contested the American
evaluation of the Hardtack II data and
refused to consider Albert Latter’s de-
coupling theory. Thus, the capability
of the control system recommended by
the Conference of Experts remained in
dispute.
In February 1960 the United States
proposed a phased treaty, which would
initially outlaw nuclear testing in envi-
ronments where American scientists felt
adequate control could be established
and which could be extended as war-
ranted by improvements in control
capabilities. The United States had
suggested the possibility of a partial ban
as early as April 1959, but the Soviet
Union had rejected this almost out of
hand. In addition, the United States
indicated its willingness to enter into a
joint research program with the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union to im-
prove control capabilities. After some
sparring, the Soviet Union accepted
these suggestions on the condition that
there be a moratorium on testing in the
environments not covered by the initial
phase. Agreement seemed to be in
sight, and a fourth meeting of scientists
from East and West was scheduled to
plan a research program. The Seismic
Research Program Advisory Group met
in May 1960, simultaneously with the
planned meeting of heads of state in
Paris. At first, the talks proceeded
smoothly, and the Soviet scientists
seemed to agree that the problem of de-
tecting underground nuclear explosions
was more difficult than had originally
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been thought. However, it is an open
question whether or not the talks would
have produced an agreement had it
not been for the denouement in Paris.
It was obvious that there were deep
differences between the American and
Soviet scientists on what to do about
low-yield nuclear explosions and the
decoupling theory. The Soviet scientists
seemed to imply that these problems
were beyond solution, at least in polit-
ically acceptable terms, and therefore
ought not to be examined.
As it was, however, these differences
became almost irrelevant. With the
collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting,
the test-ban negotiations took a radical
turn for the worse. From that point
on, despite the fact that the Geneva
Conference continued in session until
January 29, 1962 and the negotiations
were carried on after that in other
forums, virtually no progress was made
until December 1962. Several signifi-
cant concessions offered by the West
after the Kennedy Administration as-
sumed office met only Soviet rebuffs.
The end of f the moratorium
The most notable event was the
Soviet Union’s unilateral abrogation of
the moratorium on nuclear testing on
September 1, 1961, despite the pledge
given several times by Nikita S.
Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders,
among other places before the General
Assembly of the United Nations, that
the Soviet Union would not resume
testing unless the West did. Earlier in
1961 the Soviet Union had rejected
United States suggestions for reciprocal
inspection of American and Soviet
test sites to ensure that neither side
was preparing to test nuclear weapons.
The Soviet tests, which clearly were
the result of extensive preparations,
yielded significant results, and the
United States and the United Kingdom
felt compelled to conduct tests of their
own.
Among other things, these tests pro-
vided much more evidence on the prob-
lem of detecting underground nuclear
explosions, and, on the basis of this and
further research which had been con-
ducted in the interim, American scien-
tists concluded that this task was even
easier than had been thought during
the period of the Conference of Ex-
perts, thus reversing their previous
pessimistic reappraisal.2 2
The Moscow Treaty
It is impossible to know what would
have happened had not the Cuban
crisis occurred in the fall of 1962.
There is some evidence to suggest that
both the United States and the Soviet
Union felt that only marginal gains
could be made in areas of weapons de-
velopment in which they were interested
through further atmospheric testing.
Thus, even without a test ban, there
might have been a sharp decline in test-
ing in that environment. However, the
threat of nuclear war implicit in the
Cuban crisis seemed to compel both
sides to seek a détente. In late 1962
and early 1963 the question of a com-
prehensive test ban was again seriously
explored, but the Soviet Union was
unwilling to accept even the greatly
simplified international control mech-
anisms that the United States proposed.
The next and final move, the acceptance
in the summer of 1963 of a partial test
ban policed by national detection sys-
tems, came in the context of a serious
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.
2 See Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency William C. Foster’s
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Disarmament on July 25, 1962: U. S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament,
Renewed Geneva Negotiations: Hearings
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 10-11.
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VVEAKNESSES IN AMERICAN POLICY
Viewed in one light, the record can be
read as a tribute to American patience
and as a triumph for the American
concept that arms-control agreements
ought only to cover those aspects that
can adequately be controlled. In a
different light, the record reveals certain
basic weaknesses in American policy.
Inadequate technical preparation
Throughout the negotiations, the level
of the United States technical prepara-
tion left much to be desired. During
the Conference of Experts, the United
States based its calculations for elabo-
rating control measures over under-
ground nuclear explosions on one ex-
periment. Subsequent experience proved
that this base was too narrow. Several
times American scientists discussed and
agreed to control devices which did
not exist and the real operational
capacities of which therefore could not
fully be known. An operating proto-
type of the control station recom-
mended by the Conference of Experts in
1958 did not exist until October 1960.
The satellites recommended by Tech-
nical Working Group I for the detec-
tion of nuclear explosions in outer
space were not put into orbit until the
fall of 1963, and an entire system would
not be operational for another three
years. Twice during the negotiations,
the United States attempted to settle
technical issues despite the foreknowl-
edge that relevant experiments would
be conducted during the technical dis-
cussions or after their conclusion. This
occurred, as will be recalled, in the case
of the Conference of Experts. It also
occurred with respect to Technical
Working Group II. The first major
experiment in Operation Cowboy, a
series of chemical explosions designed to
test Albert Latter’s decoupling theory,
was conducted on December 17, 1959,
the day before the Working Group
recessed. The tests in this series would
continue until mid-March 1960.
This is not to argue that the level of
American technical preparation was in-
ferior to that of the Soviet Union,
for the record certainly does not in-
dicate this. On the contrary, the
United States scientists provided by far
the largest proportion of the technical
data. Given the asymmetrical interest
in control-which, regardless of whether
or not it is desirable, will probably con-
tinue as long as Western societies main-
tain a higher degree of openness than
Communist regimes-the situation re-
quires that the West be better prepared
technically than the East. Nor is it
to attempt to set absolute and ideal
standards by which to judge the Amer-
ican performance. It is merely to
state that the United States level of
technical preparation was not adequate
to the seriousness of the task. Ad-
mittedly, it is impossible always to
foresee or control the pace of negotia-
tions, but in 1958 a test ban was an
issue of long standing, and the United
States was unprepared despite its
salience.
In part, technical preparation is a
function of administrative and financial
support. The United States position in
1958, among other things, reflected
the relatively low priority accorded to
arms control and disarmament matters
within the government then. Presum-
ably the situation has at least been im-
proved with the establishment of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Clearly, more human and physical
resources are now devoted to tasks in
this area. Whether or not sufficient
resources are allocated to these matters,
though, is an unanswered question. It
is perhaps significant that the Vela
Project of research concerning the
detection of nuclear explosions con-
tinues to be housed within the Depart-
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ment of Defense, among other reasons
because it would overwhelm the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. Its
annual budget is several times that of
the Agency.
Technical preparation is also a func-
tion of the linkage between political
intelligence and technical research.
Forthcoming technical issues have to
be defined far enough in advance so
that scientists have ample time to probe
their complexities. Again, the establish-
ment of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency should help to create
and maintain this linkage. Moreover,
the Office of the Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Tech-
nology and the President’s Science Ad-
visory Committee-both created as re-
sponses to the sputnik crisis of the fall
of 1957-are now much more firmly
established as parts of the governmental
structure than they were in 1958. Rep-
resentatives of the scientific community
now have an unquestioned place in the
nation’s highest policy councils. Per-
haps as much has been done as is pos-
sible in terms of institutional arrange-
ments. The questions which remain-
and which by their nature are presently
unanswerable-center on whether suffi-
cient thought is given to future prob-
lems.
Lack of political decisions
A second weakness in the American
position revealed in the nuclear test-ban
negotiations is that until 1961 the
United States was politically unpre-
pared. Crucial decisions were ignored,
postponed, or settled ambiguously. The
United States called for the Conference
of Experts without any clear notion of
what function it would serve, other
than to delay matters while the 1958
test series could be carried out. The
American scientists went to the Con-
ference of Experts without any firm
instructions on the minimum require-
ments that a control system would have
to meet-especially on the matter of
the threshold of detectability-to be
consistent with United States security
interests. Despite the fact that Tech-
nical Working Group I accepted all but
one of the detection systems proposed
by American scientists, a month and a
half elapsed before the United States
accepted &dquo;the report as a correct tech-
nical assessment ... in the light of
presently available scientific knowl-
edge.&dquo; 3 Almost two years passed be-
fore the United States submitted a
proposal based on the report of the
Working Group for the incorporation
of detection devices for high altitude
and outer space in the control
mechanism.
At no time prior to 1961 did the
United States table an entire draft
treaty. The basic reason for this situa-
tion was the deep division within the
Eisenhower Administration on the wis-
dom of attempting to negotiate a test-
ban treaty. It could be argued, how-
ever, that the United States would
have been better off not to negotiate
at all rather than to negotiate on the
basis of an uncertain position. As it
was, the United States was cast in an
unfavorable light, and its emphasis on
control-an important part of its pos-
ture with respect to arms control and
disarmament matters-was blurred. The
United States seemed not to know what
it wanted and to be unwilling to ac-
cept what its scientists proposed. More-
over, depending on one’s estimate of
Soviet intentions, it might have been
possible to achieve an agreement earlier,
and one that perhaps would have been
more comprehensive and would have
included some international control
3 Geneva Conference for the Discontinuance
of Nuclear Weapon Tests, Document GEN/
DNT/PV. 127, p. 4. Hereafter documents
of this conference will be cited by their
symbol and number only.
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features. Clearly, if progress is to be
made, risks will have to be estimated
and balanced and decisions taken.
Technical preparation can only be
meaningful if there is a framework
provided by political decisions.
Failure to maintain a deterrent
Finally, the inability of the United
States to respond rapidly to the Soviet
Union’s abrogation of the moratorium
on nuclear testing demonstrates the
danger of dropping one’s guard. Start-
ing with fiscal year 1960, no funds had
been budgeted for testing nuclear
weapons, and test sites were maintained
on a minimal basis. There was some
construction at the Nevada site in con-
nection with proposed detonations in
the peaceful-uses program, but, at the
Pacific test site, the only objective was
to retard and to the extent possible
prevent the inevitable deterioration re-
sulting from the climate. In addition,
American scientists appear to have been
reluctant to plan weapon tests during
the period of the moratorium. Because
of the openness of the procedures of
American government, such as congres-
sional hearings on budgetary requests,
the lack of preparation was in large
measure a matter of public knowledge.
Thus, the Soviet Union knew in the
fall of 1961 that it could break the
moratorium without fear of immediate
retaliation in kind. Obviously, this is
a situation that invites difficulty and, in
testifying before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in support of the
Moscow Treaty, administration leaders
pledged that it would not be repeated.4
Some participants in the negotiations
and analysts of them have gone some-
what farther and questioned the wisdom
of engaging in a moratorium before an
agreement had been completed. Their
argument is that doing this eliminated
an incentive to reach agreement.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
The negotiations also have broader
implications. It is sobering to realize
that it took five years to achieve such
a limited accord and to consider that
even this might not have been gained
had it not been for the Cuban crisis
and heightened Sino-Soviet tensions.
The necessity for balance
One explanation for the tedious pace
of the negotiations is that both United
States and Soviet leaders from time to
time appear to have had serious doubts
about whether or not stopping testing
would actually serve their security
interests. It is perhaps instructive that
the balance with respect to the state
of the art concerning nuclear weapons
technology in the Soviet Union and the
United States appears to have been
much more ambiguous and, in over-all
terms, probably more even in 1963 at
the time of the signature of the Moscow
Treaty than it was in 1958 when the
negotiations opened. Indeed, common
sense suggests that neither side in a
technological race will be willing to
stop if it feels that it is behind and
there is a chance of catching up. Rela-
tive parity, therefore, may well be a
useful criterion for use in selecting other
areas in which to attempt to negotiate
arms-control agreements.
Problems relating to control
The slow progress of the negotiations
can also be attributed to matters relat-
ing to the substance of the negotiations,
especially to the concept of control.
The statement that the United States
wanted an international control sys-
4 See, for example, the testimony of Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
Glen T. Seaborg: U. S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty: Hearings (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1963),
pp. 107, 208-209.
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tem while the Soviet Union did not
is partially true and conveys some of
the difficulties. The controversies cen-
tered on the details, and the negotia-
tions set in bold relief the Soviet
Union’s reluctance to allow incursions
into its territory and distrust of inter-
national organizations that it does not
control. At the same time, the United
States was clearly unwilling to counte-
nance the establishment of an inter-
national control system in which the
Soviet Union’s consent would be a
necessary condition of most actions. The
negotiations thus reaffirmed the common
understanding that, in these matters,
the international position of the two
states and their strategic interests are
significantly different.
The negotiations also revealed an-
other difficulty related to the problem of
control. The issue was that of attempt-
ing to create a control mechanism in an
area where relatively little was known
and the state of knowledge was rapidly
changing.
The American approach was to at-
tempt to frame control measures on the
basis of knowledge as of that moment,
in as legally precise terms as possible.
For example, in the technical discus-
sions the American scientists generally
insisted that any agreement specify in
detail the characteristics of any in-
struments recommended for inclusion in
the control system. Because the under-
standing of the technical situation
changed during the course of the nego-
tiations, this led to certain embarrass-
ments and other difficulties. At one
point during Technical Working Group
II, Hans Bethe maintained: 5
We believe that the experts in 1958 knew
quite well about instruments, but we
believe that we now know even better
about them. We do not believe that the
experts of the control commission will
know any better than we know.
To argue in abutting sentences that
knowledge had changed but would not
change again posed, at the least, certain
logical complications.
The position of the American scien-
tists was not without justification, how-
ever. The negotiations themselves con-
tained a record of dispute about the
meanings of agreements, and certainly
this has been a prominent feature of
the pattern of East-West relations since
the Second World War. Moreover,
fairly early in the negotiations, it was
agreed that any basic changes in the
proposed international control system
would require the consent of the original
parties-that is, of the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Thus, the American scientists
felt that they had to include. everything
that might conceivably be thought of in
any agreement.
The difficulty with the American posi-
tion was that it could not accommodate
technological change. The nuclear
test-ban negotiations illustrate clearly
how much these matters are subject
to change, and the failure of Technical
Working Group II shows how difficult
it would be to obtain agreement on
changing a control system. The Soviet
Union was obviously not willing to
admit that the control system recom-
mended by the Conference of Experts
was not as effective as had been
thought and thus by implication to
agree that additional control features
would be necessary for a comprehensive
treaty. One wonders, also, if the
United States would have been willing
to accept less control than provided in
the original agreement, if the technical
situation improved, as it subsequently
did. Given the asymmetrical position
of the two sides on matters of control,
simply to negotiate an initial agreement
is difficult enough.
Significantly, the Moscow Treaty
avoids many of these problems by rely-5 GEN/DNT/TWG. 2/PV. 12, p. 16.
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ing primarily on national control sys-
tems. Indeed, administration officials
testifying in support of the Treaty be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations cited as one of its attractions
the fact that most of the elements to
ensure control were solely within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the United
States and that, therefore, improvements
could be made readily and as needed.
In the past, American policy concerning
arms control has stressed the necessity
of international control. Perhaps this
experience suggests the wisdom of plac-
ing greater emphasis on what can be
called reciprocal or adversary control 6
This might simplify the problem of ob-
taining agreement and also that of ac-
commodating technological change.
CONCLUSIONS
It is impossible to predict what will
follow the Moscow Treaty. Surely,
however, the Treaty in itself should be
a cause of some optimism. And, while
reviewing the record of the negotiations
does not clearly indicate the path to be
followed in seeking the next steps
toward easing tension between East and
West, it does suggest ways in which
the United States might improve its
capacity to search for this path and
certain criteria which might be em-
ployed in seeking likely routes. Per-
haps this, too, should be a cause for
optimism, for it implies that the future
is at least to some extent susceptible to
manipulation.
6 The case for such a course is developed
persuasively in: Fred C. Ikl&eacute; and Others,
Alternative Approaches to the International
Organization of Disarmament (R-391-ARPA;
Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1962) ;
Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Uses of
Reciprocal Inspection," pp. 82-98 in Seymour
Melman (ed.), Disarmament: Its Politics and
Economics (Boston: The American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, 1962) ; and Lawrence
S. Finkelstein, "Arms Inspection," Inter-
national Counciliation, No. 540 (November
1962), pp. 5-89.
